Saturday, October 25, 2008

The Effects of the Cyprus problem on Turkey






*This article is an excerpt from my term paper for my "Geography as the context of International Affairs" subject with Prof. Clarita carlos.






(Conclusive remarks)



The effects to Turkey’s bid of the Cyprus problem could generally be seen on the political level. For one, Cyprus (Greek-Cypriots officials) has warned Turkey that it must recognize the Greek Cypriot government if it wants support for its EU application.[1] We must remember that the international community does not recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus created when Turkey seized the area in 1974 after a short-lived Greek-inspired coup, and Turkey in return does not recognize the south or Greek Cypriots government. Following what a state wants is clearly not a requirement for membership in the union. However, according to Daniel Schroder, “fulfilling the criteria for EU membership is no longer merely a matter of procedure, but can also involve a political decision” and this could provide negative implications. This could be seen affecting Turkey’s bid for membership through Cyprus political lobbying and threatening to use their veto power. For example, in a news article from Turkish Daily News, Greek Cypriot government has raised the controversial cases of the seizure of the Çukurova Elektrik (ÇEAŞ) and Kepez Elektrik to alter the course of Turkey’s negotiations with the European Union. With this case, the Greek Cypriots have found a way to push the European Commission to put a benchmark in the chapter on energy to ensure that Ankara complies with the result of the pending arbitration claim filed by Cypriot company Libananco Holdings against the state of Turkey. This perhaps implies an effort to slow down the negotiation process of Turkey. The Republic of Cyprus can use such, among many others to induce Turkey to recognize first them.[2] This recognition is deemed important since, for instance, the port and seaways of Turkey and the area of Turkish-Cypriot could be open to this south part of Cyprus and other members of EU that could subsequently attracts more benefits according to some Greek-Cypriot scholars.

However, Turkey refuses to open such ports to the Cypriots’ plane and vessels and insists that it will only do so after the EU proposal to open up a direct trade with Turkish Cypriots and provide them the €259,000,000 in funds to help them upgrade their infrastructure is fulfilled. The bone of contention involving Cyprus may sound like a mere technicality, but for Turkey, it means recognizing the Greek Cypriot government as the only legitimate authority on the hotly contested island.[3] And this they will not allow since it inflict and contradict their previous stance.

Nevertheless, developments have been higlighted recently. Turkey, despite several setbacks, closed its first chapter of negotiations as regards accession in June 2006. The earliest date that Turkey could enter the EU is 2013, the date when the next financial perspectives (the EU's six year budgetary perspectives) will come into force. Ankara is currently aiming to comply with EU law by this date,[4] but Brussels has refused to back 2013 as a deadline.[5] It is believed that the accession process will take at least until 2021.

To what have transcribed, it shows that Cyprus particularly the Greek Cypriot government wanted first the solution of the Cyprus problem --- the division of Cyprus to Greek and Turkish communities. Ironically, Greece leaders, supposed to be on the Greek Cypriots side, have proclaimed its support for Ankara's membership.[6] Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis has described Turkey's recognition of Cyprus as "an obvious condition", but at the same time has apparently advised his Greek Cypriot counterpart not to rock the boat. [7]It means that they should not be aggressive enough because it might cause further problems. The Greek officials have also hinted at the prospect of a compromise as a way around the dispute.

The crux of the matter is; the issue of Cyprus plays a crucial part in Turkey’s bid for membership. However, this does not suggest that EU is one in asking for the solution of the conflict first before Turkey’s membership to EU could be granted. In general, Europe is divided on the Turkey’s accession issues. Concerns on security, strategic importance, religion and culture, have been the source of debate on whether Turkey’s bid to be a member of the European club will flourish or not, will expedite or slow down. Consideration on the importance of Turkey, probably its strategic location and power, on EU could be one reason on why they cannot force Turkey to help provide solutions on the Cyprus conflict. “The EU's basic dilemma now is how to register its displeasure without provoking Turkey to walk away from the negotiating table.”[8] This issue however, could be raised up by further discussion that concedingly not taken up by this paper.

The Cyprus problem and its effects to Turkey’s bid for membership to the European Union could at least be viewed as having direct correlation. When, Cyprus problem is solved, or at least nears to finding a solution, the Turkey’s bid for membership could be affected positively. Yet further events and developments may mitigate the nearing solution of the problem or it may start a fire that can bring the parties in their old ways of conflict. Who knows? Only time can tell.












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[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4085283.stm

[2] Cyprus uses controversial Çeaş-Kapez case to demand recognition
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=73474 May 18, 2007

[3] Daniela Schröder http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-301/_nr-62/_p-1/i.html

[4] Kubosova, Lucia (2007-03-30). "Turkey targets 2013 for EU legal compliance", EUobserver. Retrieved on 2008-08-26.

[5] Kubosova, Lucia (2007-04-17). "Brussels declines to endorse 2013 date for Turkey's EU entry", EUobserver. Retrieved on 2008-08-26.

[6] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4085283.stm

[7] Ibid;
[8]
Daniela Schröder http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-301/_nr-62/_p-1/i.html

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